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No More Principles of War?
RUSSELL W. GLENN

From Parameters, Spring 1998, pp. 48-66.
"Objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise,
simplicity." -- The US Army's Principles of War, 1993

For the moment, America's Army has not one but two sets of principles for military operations. The first is the
traditional list of nine, last examined in 1993. The second contains principles for operations other than war. The first
formally appeared in US Army documents in 1921 (albeit in a slightly different form); the principles of operations
other than war (OOTW) were introduced in the 1993 Operations manual. The principles of war have assumed a
character of permanence, but soldiers and others have frequently challenged them, believing variously that nuclear
weapons, improved understanding of irregular warfare, or the enhanced influence of public opinion and the media had
made the list incomplete or no longer of value. The principles have nonetheless changed but slightly. In an army where
change is the norm, the principles of war have remained largely unassailable.
Yet the sense of permanence is deceiving, for the history of the current principles of war is a volatile one. Even their
presentation as a brief list with concise descriptions is a 20th-century phenomenon. John I. Alger noted:
The term "principles of war" did not always connote the idea of a list of rules intended to facilitate the
conduct of war. In fact, two distinct definitions of the term have been widely used. First, the principles of
war represented a commonly accepted philosophy concerning the myriad of activities that collectively
compose the conduct of war. In the present century, however, the idea that the principles of war are an
enumerated list of considerations, few in number, capable of being simply expressed and essential to the
successful conduct of war, has become increasingly accepted. The former definition was used by writers
on war for centuries, but the latter, though it has become the standard in English-speaking nations,
originated in the Napoleonic era--quite possibly with Napoleon himself.[1]
Strategist Bernard Brodie was less reticent when he wrote,
Although Clausewitz himself speaks loosely of certain "principles" to be observed and followed, . . . he
specifically rejected the notion that there could be any well-defined body of particular rules or principles
that universally dictated one form of behavior rather than another. . . . It was not until the twentieth century
that various army field manuals would attempt to encapsulate centuries of experience and volumes of
reflection into a few tersely worded and usually numbered "principles of war." Clausewitz would have
been appalled at such attempts, and not surprised at some of the terrible blunders that have been made in
the name of those "principles."[2]
Perhaps Clausewitz would have been appalled; then again, he seems to have recognized that a few words are far easier
to recall after fatigue and stress have blurred a leader's mind. "We must have recourse to the relevant principles
established by theory," Clausewitz wrote. "These truths should always be allowed to become self-evident. . . . We will
thus avoid using an arcane and obscure language, and express ourselves in plain speech, with a sequence of clear, lucid
concepts."[3] Clausewitz, it seems, would have had little problem with the tersely worded principle of "simplicity."
The Army is now revising--for the second time since 1989--its fundamental doctrine. FM 100-5, Operations, will have
been updated nine times since 1945--on average every six years--when the 1998 version is published. Among the
significant changes presented in the initial drafts of the 1998 edition were these: the "principles of operations other

than war" were eliminated, two current principles were revised and two new ones added, and the resulting list was
redesignated as "principles of operations." After vigorous debate in the field, with some soldiers strongly favoring the
changes and others lending less support, the current draft of Operations leaves the "traditional" nine principles
unaltered from their 1986 form.
The inquiring mind might wonder at this support for the status quo. Perhaps it was a reaction to seemingly
uncontrollable change in the Army. Perhaps there is a belief within the service that the durability of the principles
provides an anchor for Army doctrine. Conversely, the choice for constancy may have been made in ignorance of the
origins of the principles and their historic mutability.
This article proceeds from the final proposition above. It has three objectives: first, to describe how the "traditional"
principles assumed their current form, and second, to explain why eliminating "principles of operations other than
war" is essential. Finally, the article suggests that the modifications and additions to the principles of war originally
proposed for the next version of the Army's operational doctrine deserve one more look before we commit the Army's
active and reserve components to a set of operational principles that may not yet be quite "all they can be."
The Origins of the Principles
The US Army first provided its soldiers a list of principles in 1921. Training Regulation No. 10-5 listed nine principles
of war identical to those in use today with the exception that "movement" and "cooperation" stood in the place of
"maneuver" and "unity of command," respectively. This first appearance included no discussion of individual
principles. The single paragraph that described their purpose and use also declared them to be "immutable." Charles A.
Willoughby, who would later make his name as Douglas MacArthur's World War II Intelligence Chief in the Pacific,
took the inviolate status of the principles a step further in his Maneuver in War. "These principles are basic and
immutable," he wrote; "the great commanders have been guided by them, and success or failure has depended upon the
extent and manner of their use. They are not subject to exception. Their proper execution constitutes the true measure
of the military art."[4] Willoughby published his work in 1939, the same year the principles reentered US Army
doctrine. They had disappeared after 1928, only to reappear in the 1939 FM 100-5, Tentative Field Service
Regulations, Operations.
Willoughby traced the origins of these fundamentals, at the time new to the Army. He quoted Napoleon, who wrote
that "Caesar's principles were the same as those of Alexander and Hannibal: (a) to keep his forces in junction, (b) not
to be vulnerable in any direction, [and] (c) to advance rapidly on important points." From these, Willoughby believed,
"One can hardly fail to recognize (a) the principle of concentration, (b) the principle of security, and (c) the principle
of the objective." Willoughby went on to extract what he thought was a comprehensive and concise list of Napoleon's
principles by culling them from the emperor's writings, concluding that they included objective, offensive, mass,
surprise, security, and movement.[5] British military theorist J. F. C. Fuller did not concur with Willoughby's
approach, believing that Napoleon laid "down no definite principles, yet he apparently worked by well-defined
ones."[6]
As Alger recognized, Napoleon and other pre-20th-century practitioners and theorists of war believed that war had
fundamental rules, but they felt no compulsion to attempt their concise articulation.[7] Nor did these earlier soldiers
agree on the extent to which a commander was constrained by such rules. Writing in the first half of the 19th century,
Jomini asserted that "the fundamental principles upon which rest all good combinations of war have always existed,
and to them all others should be referred for the purpose of arriving at their respective merits. These principles are
unchangeable; they are independent of the arms employed, of times, and of places."[8] His contemporary Clausewitz
did not share this sense of the principles' universality. Clausewitz concluded that the principles were important as
guides rather than Jomini's rules "upon which rest all good combinations of war." Clausewitz continued:
Where the arch of truth culminates in such a keystone this tendency will be underlined. But this is simply
in accordance with the scientific law of reason, to indicate the point at which all lines converge, but never
to construct an algebraic formula for use on the battlefield. Even these principles and rules are intended to
provide a thinking man with a frame of reference for the movements he has been trained to carry out,
rather than to serve as a guide which at the moment of action lays down precisely the path he must

take.[9]
Both men agreed that principles of war existed; both discussed them at some length; neither provided the brief list that
today's soldiers have come to expect.
Perhaps no Western military writer put more thought into the possibility that war's actions could be characterized by a
single set of principles than J. F. C. Fuller. His lists evolved as he mulled over their nuances in many of his books and
articles written before, during, and after the First World War. In his 1926 The Foundations of the Science of War, he
listed three groups of principles, each of which itself contained three principles of war:
Principles of Control: direction, determination, and mobility
Principles of Pressure: concentration, surprise, and offensive action
Principles of Resistance: distribution, endurance, and security
Fuller explained the relationship among the groups as follows: "We thus obtain a threefold order of control springing
from a dual order of pressure and resistance, each of these dual forces being in itself a threefold one. Ultimately these
three groups form one group--economy of force."[10]
Fuller's contemporary B. H. Liddell Hart joined what was a growing fascination in Western armies with his discussion
of maxims. Though Liddell Hart refused to call them principles in his 1932 The British Way in Warfare (for his were
"practical guides, not abstract principles"), he nevertheless concluded that "the principles of war, not merely one
principle, can be condensed into a single word--`concentration.' But for truth this needs to be amplified as the
`concentration of strength against weakness.'. . . Here we have a fundamental principle whose understanding may
prevent the fundamental error (and the most common)--that of giving your opponent freedom and time to concentrate
to meet your concentration." Liddell Hart went on to list his six maxims, saying "four are positive and two negative.
They apply both to strategy and to tactics":[11]
Choose the line (or course) of least expectation.
Exploit the line of least resistance.
Take a line of operations which offers alternative objectives.
Ensure that both plan and dispositions are elastic, or adaptable.
Don't lunge whilst your opponent can parry.
Don't renew an attack along the same line (or in the same form) after it has once failed.
With their reemergence in the US Army's 1939 Tentative FM 100-5, the nine principles listed in the 1921 Training
Regulation 10-5, Doctrine, Principles, and Methods, took the form of seven "General Principles" for use during the
"conduct of war":[12]
Ultimate objective
Concentration of superior forces, which required "strict economy in the strength of forces assigned to secondary
missions"
Offensive action, though "a defensive attitude may, however, be deliberately adopted as a temporary expedient"
Unity of effort
Surprise
Security
Simple and direct plans
There was no list of principles in the 1941 FM 100-5. The reader was instead presented with several "doctrines of
combat": ultimate objective, simple and direct plans and methods, unity of effort, offensive action, concentration of
superior forces, surprise, and security.[13] Only with the arrival of the 1949 FM 100-5 did the principles of war match
those in that manual's 1993 counterpart. The current, seemingly sacred, list of nine principles is therefore only 49 years
old.
The Principles of War and the Modern Environment of Conflict

Though the purpose and utility of principles of war were apparent to many military theorists in the first half of the
20th century, the introduction of nuclear weapons, increased influence of irregular warfare, and other changes caused
some to question their value. Writing during the second decade of the Cold War, John Keegan concluded that "one of
the purposes behind the principles has been to make new and strange circumstances comprehensible, to draw a thread
from one war to another, to force events into a mold, and to make conflicts obey the dramatic unities. . . . A point is
reached in the development of weapon systems beyond which one cannot compare the present and the past." Keegan
went on to argue that the principles inherently implied "maximization of means," and therefore they were applicable to
neither limited nuclear war nor modern conventional war. The latter demanded "subtle response, patience, self-control,
firmness but not ruthlessness, and an ability to settle for something less than total victory,"[14] qualities Keegan
implied were not supported by the nine principles of war. That the application of those principles demanded
adjustment of the means to the political objective, notably that all principles were ultimately subordinate to that of the
"objective," did not enter into Keegan's argument. He seems to have had little faith that Western military leaders of the
era could apply the principles with the skill Clausewitz, Fuller, and others required.
At the other extreme were arguments that the principles had universal application, that they were "a collection of
concise rules for warfare intended to aid battle leaders from the low-ranking officer to the general. Whether these rules
are called principles, maxims, or axioms, they are independent of time, place, and situation."[15] Such an argument
was alluring on the surface; it would have been convenient if true, but the principles themselves had changed
repeatedly both in appearance and substance since their 1921 introduction. These changes were necessary to ensure
that the principles maintained pace with doctrinal changes, changes themselves in part driven by advances in
technology, adaptations by adversaries and potential adversaries, better understanding of military theory, and revisions
in national strategy. The 1939 principle of "concentration," for example, was altered not only in form (later appearing
as "mass"), but in substance over the ensuing decades. Limited ranges and the direct-fire nature of artillery in
Napoleon's time meant that concentration required the bringing together of many soldiers and weapons at a given place
and time on the battlefield. Later such concentration was not only unnecessary--technology permitted massing effects
while leaving the means dispersed--it was potentially counterproductive. Rigid application of the principles, dictated
rather than demonstrated by previous applications, was likely to promote failure rather than success.[16]
Writing in Military Review in 1991, William C. Bennett understood the need for flexibility in applying the principles.
He concluded that the principles of war in fact applied to actions that were outside the traditional scope of what was
meant by war. Discussing Operation Just Cause in Panama (1989-90), he noted, "Certain events indicate that when the
principles of war are applied to short-duration contingency operations in a [low-intensity conflict] environment, the
interpretation of the principles must be viewed within a broader context than normal. The forms that some of the
principles may take are likely to be less traditional or `military' and more `police' or `political' in nature." The earliest
introduction of the principles in the 1921 training regulations had shared this vision of greater scope during
application: "Their application varies with the situation . . . not only in purely military work, but in administration and
business operation. . . . All active military operations will be planned and executed in accordance with these
principles."[17]
Like those of the Army, the principles of war for other US armed services have changed over time. At one time the Air
Force added "timing and tempo," "logistics," and "cohesion" to the list of nine it shared with the Army.[18] The Navy
and Air Force currently use the same nine principles of war listed in the Army's 1993 FM 100-5 and Joint Pub 1, but
unsurprisingly the definitions and applications vary somewhat.[19] In Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1,
Warfighting, the Marine Corps speaks to "two concepts of such significance and universality that we can advance them
as principles: concentration and speed." Otherwise the manual only alludes to the nine currently in use by the other
services in their primary operational manuals.[20] The Marine Corps also refers (in FMFM 1-3, Tactics ) to "principles
of tactics--gaining a decisive advantage, moving faster than the enemy, trapping the enemy, and the goal of all of
them, achieving a decisive result." By implication, cooperation appears to be another element in this list.[21]
The US Army's Principles in Application
Virtually all students of war have considered the principles and their applicability to combat operations sometime
during their careers. The value of principles to such operations is readily apparent. It is less so, however, when the
nature of the operations in question varies from those from which the principles evolved. This is the case when

considering irregular warfare, space operations, weapons of mass destruction, or military activities that fall outside the
range of those associated with traditional forms of conventional conflict. Many agreed with Keegan that the principles
had little value when considering nuclear war. Others recognized the need for adaptation rather than disposal; John O.
Shoemaker concluded, "the principles of war have definite application to the Cold War. . . . In the military profession
great stress is laid upon reducing problems to terms that can be easily understood. More important perhaps is the effort
devoted to defining objectives, tasks, and desired goals in sufficient detail and clarity that they cannot be
misunderstood."[22] Josiah A. Wallace similarly concluded that the principles were sufficiently robust to serve as
guides to actions in counterinsurgencies, finding they were an "excellent device for the commander to use in analyzing
all aspects of his counterinsurgency plans. If his plans conform to the principles of war, he is on firm ground."[23]
James H. Mueller likewise concluded that the principles of war were applicable to air, space, and aerospace doctrine
and operations.[24]
Although military requirements and political objectives might differ widely, conclusions that support application of the
principles of war to nuclear scenarios, irregular warfare contingencies, and space applications are unlikely to surprise
students of conflict. The capabilities needed and technologies applied may differ profoundly from case to case, but the
fundamental subordinate relationship of military force to national objectives is still the same as that explained by
Clausewitz: "The political object--the original motive for the war--will thus determine both the military objective to be
reached and the amount of effort it requires."[25]
The Principles of Not Only War
Similar reasoning makes an apparent oxymoron logical: the application of the principles of war to military operations
not involving war. (See Figure 1, page 58.) Many, if not all, of the principles appear to be of value when executing
non-wartime operations just as they have been during war. Emory R. Helton concluded that six of the nine principles
of war--objective, offensive, security, unity of command, economy of force, and simplicity--applied to Operation
Provide Comfort in northern Iraq conducted after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and that "five of these will probably
apply to any future humanitarian operations."[26] There is every reason to believe that mass, maneuver, and surprise
would apply to operations that focused on stability or support requirements.
General Pershing perceived this wider application of the principles. There were considerable changes in the character
of war over the span of his career, "but the principles of warfare as I learned them at West Point remain unchanged,"
he wrote. "They were verified by my experience in our Indian wars, and also during the campaign against the
Spaniards in Cuba. I applied them in the Philippines and observed their application in Manchuria during the RussoJapanese War."[27]
More recently, Richard Rinaldo argued that it was counterproductive to separate principles guiding war and operations
other than war (OOTW): "This distinction seeks to create independence where there is interdependence, division where
there is unity."[28] Rinaldo went on to posit, much as did Pershing, that "the principles of war . . . are robust enough to
withstand application across the full range of military operations. . . . OOTW is an unnecessary category for doctrinal
treatment in terms of principles and fundamental guidelines."[29] Brodie concurred in this regard, concluding that the
principles were "essentially common sense propositions which are generally but by no means exclusively pertinent to
the waging of war."[30]
The principles of war have indeed been more robust than a narrow interpretation of their purpose would admit. Their
application always demands careful consideration of the requirements unique to a given situation; with adaptation and
exercise of the coup d'oeil so treasured by Clausewitz, however, this application is feasible even beyond the bounds of
the battlefield.
Such adaptation implies flexibility not only in application, but in the definitions of the principles. Roger A. Beaumont
believed "the list should be continually reviewed and updated, and used as a working tool for analysis. . . . New
technologies of war may alter the balance and make new factors paramount. The military art, like any other, is
continually in a state of evolution, with part of its nature formed by the past and the materials, and its essence deriving
from the innovative genius of the artist."[31]
Well-considered combinations of the principles have been the recipe for success whether applied to war or operations

in other environments. At times one or several principles have dominated our thinking. In some instances a principle
has been irrelevant or of greater value in its violation than in its observation.[32] Again, however, more often than not
the force that better applied the wisdom inherent in the principles was the victor:
Successful strategists never knowingly violate the principles of war unless they first evaluate the risks and
estimate expenses. . . . Critics notwithstanding, the principles of war are utilitarian and they do make
sense. The record shows that winners, by and large, took heed of the principles. The losers, discounting
those who were overcome by sheer weight of manpower and material, by and large did not.[33]
With the publication of its revised doctrine in the 1998 FM 100-5, the Army plans to close the philosophical gap that
has developed between combat operations and those not involving overt fighting. That is an essential outcome of this
round of analysis of its warfighting doctrine. The first operation conducted by the fledgling US Army under the
Constitution was not during wartime; it was an action to restore peace and stability to portions of Pennsylvania
affected by the Whiskey Rebellion. Led by President Washington himself, the Army's threatened intervention ended
the trouble in an operation that would today be considered a successful operation other than war. The preemptive
character of the threat of force did not fundamentally alter the nature of the military action.
Similarly, soldiers preparing in 1998 for operations in Bosnia have had to undergo the same personal and unit
readiness training required to prepare for armed conflict. Differences in rules of engagement altered neither the need
for thorough preparation nor the utility of the principles during that preparation. Today's operational environment
demands an expanded role for soldiers; being a warrior is still a necessary, but no longer a sufficient, qualification for
service. The existing two lists of principles simply fail to emphasize what is common to any Army operation in the
field.
These two lists imply difference where there is similarity. Simplicity is a principle of war, yet not of OOTW, to which
it obviously applies in equal measure. Legitimacy is the reverse, cited as a principle of OOTW but not of war. It seems
at first glance that legitimacy ought to be a principle of both war and OOTW, but one must again consider the role of
principles. If they are in fact guides to action (rather than unquestioned truths with universal application to every
military operation), then legitimacy is far better treated as an essential condition of any operation rather than as a
principle. Unlike a principle that a commander can ignore (albeit at risk to success), no commander can reject
legitimacy as the fundamental basis for a military operation.
War is one form of military operations, the most demanding, expensive, and traumatic of them all. But recent events
reflect the historical experience of the US Army: combat is one of the least common of the kinds of operations
conducted by the majority of those in the service. It is by no means the most frequent, and in some respects it can be
less complicated than armed interventions in which the actions of a squad leader can have strategic implications.
Consequently, one list of principles--and we should call them principles of operations--should serve the full range of
military operations. There would be no requirement for every principle to apply in equal measure to every activity, nor
for some to apply to given contingencies at all. Yet each element on this established list would merit status as a
principle in part because it requires consideration during planning and execution even if it is ultimately not applicable.
Toward Clarity and Synthesis
Review of the long-standing principles of war was a natural starting point for developing a single list of principles of
operations. But the recommendations from the field to retain the pre-1993 set of principles of "war" and simply to
dispose of the principles of operations other than war misses an opportunity. We have learned lessons in this post-Cold
War era that deserve to be incorporated into the Army's next statement of land force doctrine. That we were coping
with a flawed premise about the common features of any Army operation, combat or other, in no way invalidates those
lessons. This section therefore provides the rationale for continuing on the course previously charted for the next
version of FM 100-5, Operations: take what's useful from our experiences in all recent operations, identify
opportunities to adapt, and do so.
Figure 1, below, lists the principles of war and operations other than war as they appear in Army doctrine in early
1998, and identifies the principles originally proposed for the next version. The discussion addresses principles--new

and modified--that ought to appear among those adopted by the Army in 1998.
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Figure 1. Principles of War and Operations Other than War
(as in 1993 FM 100-5, Operations) and Principles of Operations as
proposed in Initial Draft, 1998 FM 100-5, Operations.

Principle of Operations: Massed Effects (modified, previously "mass")
Though "mass" was one of the principles on the original 1921 Training Regulation 10-5 list, by the time FM 100-5
was published in 1939 "concentration" appeared in its stead. The 1993 FM 100-5 guidance regarding mass is clear and
pertinent: "Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time."[34] Unfortunately, "mass"
is frequently neither understood nor applied in this manner. When Phillip Meilinger wrote that "precision air weapons
have redefined the meaning of mass. . . . The result of the trend towards `airshaft accuracy' in air war is a denigration
in the importance of mass,"[35] he could not have been more incorrect. First, firepower is but one capability that a
commander seeks to mass. Second, precision weapons are potentially a critical component of mass as it is construed
today: the concentration of effects to accomplish the mission.[36] If one missile, bomb, or artillery projectile can
achieve a desired outcome, it is a supremely effective and efficient application of the principle of mass. The principle
of "mass" no longer means what the concept seemed to mean in Napoleonic times:[37] to bring together in time and
space soldiers or supporting weapons. Such practices now and in the future could create conditions more likely to lead
to disaster than to success by creating lucrative targets for an adversary's air and surface fire capabilities.
Nor is mass only the concentration of all fires in time and space. The concept implies the massing of the effects of all
pertinent capabilities, military and other: Army assets (armor, artillery, and aviation); joint support (intelligence means,
aviation, naval gunfire, and missiles); special forces; psychological operations; electronic warfare, and other means that
could contribute to mission success. Whether it is steel, electrons, and convincing words applied to defeat an enemy,
or the use of food and water, medical care, and engineering capabilities to aid refugees, the intent is to create and
maintain success through the massing of the effects inherent in these capabilities. R. R. Battreall similarly
misunderstood the application of the principle of mass when he wrote, "When a sufficient amount of armor is massed
at one point, it becomes the critical point."[38] "Mass" has too long been misunderstood; "massed effects" is the better
term.
Principle of Operations: Unity of Effort (modified, previously "unity of command")

As has been noted, "cooperation" rather than "unity of command" was among the original principles of war in 1921.
Unity of effort, with unity of command and cooperation as supporting concepts, first appeared in the 1939 manual as
the preferred statement of this principle. Unity of effort remained the principle in the 1941 Operations manual, with
subtle changes, but by 1949 the term was unity of command. This change occurred despite the fact that words used to
describe it were identical to those used in the 1941 edition.[39] Consider how this principle (or doctrine of combat, in
the case of the 1941 manual) was defined between 1939 and 1949 as successive authors struggled with the distinction
between the desired form (unity of command) and function (unity of effort) over the 11-year span (emphasis in the
originals):
1939: "Unity of effort is necessary to apply effectively the full combat power of the available forces. It is
obtained through unity of command. Where this is impracticable, dependence must be placed upon
cooperation."
1941: "Unity of command obtains that unity of effort which is essential to the decisive application of full
combat power of the available forces. Unity of effort is furthered by full cooperation between elements of
the command."
1949: "Unity of command obtains that unity of effort which is essential to the decisive application of full
combat power of the available forces. Unity of effort is furthered by full cooperation between elements of
the command. Command of a force of joint or combined arms is vested in the senior officer present
eligible to exercise command unless another is specifically designated to command."
The principle of unity of command that appeared in the 1993 FM 100-5 stated that "for every effort," military leaders
were to "seek unity of command and unity of effort." Unity of effort under the principles of operations other than war
in the same manual directed soldiers to "seek unity of effort toward every objective."[40]
Unity of command has historically been hard to attain. James Winnefeld called it "the single most difficult principle to
gain in combined warfare. . . . Relinquishing national command and control of force is an act of trust and confidence
that is unequaled in relations between nations. In a coalition it is achieved by constructing command arrangements and
task-organizing forces to ensure that responsibilities match contributions and efforts. . . . It is cardinal that
compromises not be permitted to outweigh warfighting requirements."[41]
Anthony Rice found unity of command "more honored in the breach than the observance" in recent American wars
and joint doctrine. What he called "parallel command" has been far more common, a situation in which nations share
common objectives but retain control of their forces. Rice provided several examples, including Douglas Haig's World
War I statement in 1915 that "I am not under General Joffre's orders, but that would make no difference, as my
intention was to do my utmost to carry out General Joffre's wishes on strategic matters as if they were orders." Haig
made that decision following guidance from the British War Minister Lord Kitchener that his command "is an
independent one and you will in any case not come under the orders of any allied general."[42]
Rice concluded that unity of command "was never established among the forces arrayed initially against the Nazis."
Further, although the United States was the "lead nation" during the Korean War, in Vietnam "the command structure
seemed to take a step back in time. . . . A parallel command structure was adopted" instead. During Operation Desert
Storm, Rice observed, the coalition "achieved a marked improvement on the command arrangements for Vietnam, but
still did not achieve unity of command."[43] The US Army failed to establish local unity of command of even Army
personnel in Somalia little more than two years later; the deaths of 18 soldiers in combat on 3-4 October 1993 was in
no small part attributable to this failure.
Rice strongly endorsed unity of command despite the historical record and a joint doctrine that emphasized unity of
effort.[44] Yet he acknowledged that the emphasis in joint doctrine on unity of effort, despite ground truth that unity of
command is the much preferred condition, reflected awareness that the latter has historically been difficult or
impossible to achieve. This difficulty has been increased by the lack of clearly articulated national and international
objectives during many operations. When military commanders must attempt to define and justify such objectives
based on vague guidance or public statements, participants in operations may find it difficult to come to a consensus on

end states, much less on the manner to achieve them.
Finally, there are organizations that may share general goals in a theater of operations but refuse to subordinate
themselves to military authority. Some nongovernmental and private volunteer organizations (NGOs and PVOs) might
respond to coercion or cajoling, but others will invariably remain autonomous. A commander might consider
withdrawing security or other support for these agencies in an attempt to compel compliance, but the strategic
implications of casualties among NGO and PVO personnel makes such a policy infeasible.
Unity of command, then, is the preferred form of coordination and control. Unity of effort, the desired effects of which
are achievement of a "common purpose and direction through unity of command, coordination, and cooperation," is
the operational function that is the prerequisite to success. Without unity of effort, any organization's work can negate
the advances made by others. Unity of effort is the function we require for success in any operation; unity of command
is the form we should seek to attain it. The operational principle is unity of effort.
Principle of Operations: Morale (new)
In Ardant Du Picq's view, "Hannibal was the greatest general of antiquity by reason of his admirable comprehension of
the morale of combat, of the morale of the soldier, whether his own or the enemy's."[45] A lengthy discussion of
leadership in the 1939 FM 100-5 asserted that "man is the fundamental instrument in war. . . . War places a severe test
on the moral stamina . . . of the individual."[46] John Baynes, in Morale, the classic study of the 2d Scottish Rifles in
World War I, concluded that "the maintenance of morale is recognized in military circles as the most important single
factor in war; outside these circles there is sometimes difficulty in appreciating why this is so."[47] Franklin D. Jones
provided an explanation for both the soldier's recognition of the paramount importance of morale and his civilian
counterpart's lack of appreciation of that importance: "Nowhere in civilian life is the social group of such major and
crucial importance in the life of the individual as it is for the soldier in combat."[48]
Maintenance of soldier and unit morale requires the building, maintaining, and restoration of fighting spirit.[49]
Morale includes the willingness to work together consistently for a common purpose, which in the Army is frequently
the accomplishment of whatever tasks are assigned to the group of which the soldier is a member. Individuals and
organizations have morale, and the good morale of both is essential to success in any military operation. The difficulty
in building and maintaining this most desirable quality is complicated by its multiple components. Self-confidence is
crucial, commitment to the unit essential, willingness to sacrifice for the whole a requirement. Field Marshal Sir
William Slim provided additional fundamental elements that included those considered necessary by many others who
have studied the subject:[50]
Morale [has] certain foundations. These foundations are spiritual, intellectual, and material, and that is the
order of their importance . . .
1. Spiritual
(a) There must be a great and noble object.
(b) Its achievement must be vital.
(c) The method of achievement must be active, aggressive.
2. Intellectual
(a) [The soldier] must be convinced that the object can be attained; that it is not
out of reach.
(b) He must see, too, that the organization to which he belongs and which is
striving to attain the object is an efficient one.
(c) He must have confidence in his leaders and know that whatever dangers and

hardships he is called upon to suffer, his life will not be lightly flung away.
3. Material
(a) The man must feel that he will get a fair deal from his commanders and from
the army generally.
(b) He must, as far as humanly possible, be given the best weapons and
equipment for his task.
(c) His living and working conditions must be made as good as they can be.
Clausewitz considered victory in hand for the side that imposed its will on the other. That concept applies to the full
range of military operations and to all parties who influence--or have the potential to influence--those operations. The
importance of robust morale to our own forces is apparent, but other groups have a say in whether American military
undertakings will be successful. The first such group is the adversary. If operations truly involve a struggle of wills,
then undermining an adversary's morale complements (and could be an alternative to) force destruction as a means of
attaining one's political and military objectives. The greater the success of psychological operations, continuous
pressure, imposed confusion, maintenance of information dominance, and other assaults on his assurance, the less other
means of influence will be needed and the sooner opposition will cease. Successful attacks on morale are likely to
prove far less costly than destruction of the personnel and equipment of an opposing force. In an era when even enemy
casualties may be counterproductive in achieving a desired end state, undermining morale may be the only means of
attaining or exploiting early successes.
Second, noncombatants in an area of operations can be ambivalent toward friendly military activities, can act in
support of friendly force efforts, or can actively resist them. The presence of diverse groups of noncombatants means
that all three conditions can occur simultaneously, and groups obviously can change behavior over time. History has
demonstrated that failure to consider the effects of apparent noncombatants on military operations can prove costly.
Napoleon's forces in Spain and Germans in the Soviet Union during World War II paid the price of failing to win the
support, or at a minimum the neutrality, of local citizens who later chose to become effective partisans. The principle
of morale, then, includes consideration of these noncombatants. Their disposition must be continuously monitored and
shaped, if not to ensure support for friendly activities, then at a minimum to foster the ambivalence that denies an
adversary their support.
Another essential component of noncombatant considerations is the American public. Clausewitz acknowledged the
importance of a nation's populace; one part of his trinity was "primordial violence, hatred, and enmity," which he
concluded "mainly concerns the people."[51] Thomas Vaughn wrote that "in a democracy such as ours, morale is also
a function of national consensus."[52] Donn A. Starry noted the dangers of an American tendency to call on the
military in support of national objectives "without first having laid the requisite groundwork to attain and sustain
strong public support for the policy course adopted."[53] Herbert Wolff, writing in 1965, presciently declared "to win
in Vietnam we require public support" and concluded such backing would prove to be so critical that public support
should be "the tenth principle of war."[54] And while the armed forces cannot exert direct influence on the American
public, US military leaders at the highest levels are in a position to suggest that political leaders recognize the need to
maintain citizen support for their armed forces during an operation.
That morale was a necessary condition to success in military operations was evident to George C. Marshall, who
described it as "a state of mind. It is steadfastness, courage and hope. It is confidence and zeal and loyalty. It is élan,
esprit de corps, and determination. It is staying power, the spirit which endures to the end--the will to win. With it, all
things are possible, without it everything else, planning, preparation, production, count for naught."[55] Morale is a
primary concern of commanders in peace and war. It deserves to be a principle of operations.
Principle of Operations: Exploitation (new)
While US military forces have often demonstrated a superb ability to identify objectives and accomplish missions,
often they have done less well at capitalizing on resultant successes.[56] Success, be it in the form of military victory

or mission accomplishment in a humanitarian operation, may prove transitory if not seized upon quickly. The military
must set the conditions for exploiting successes, whether the exploitation is to be completed through the execution of
other American military actions or after a transfer of operational responsibility to others. The principle of exploitation,
as it appeared in the initial draft of the 1998 FM 100-5, advised soldiers to "take advantage of and make lasting the
temporary effects of battlefield success."[57]
Commenting on an earlier effort to add "exploitation" as a principle of war, Wolff wrote that it failed "to stand on [its]
own merits. . . . Exploitation [is] subordinate to the principles of maneuver and objective."[58] He was correct, for
exploitation as a type of offensive operation is a function of other principles. However, the concept of exploitation
presented here has a much broader scope. It is by no means limited to combat operations, for it applies equally to any
mission. It also pertains to capitalizing on all successes, and planning to do so even before achievement of success. Too
often commanders and staffs develop plans for worst-case scenarios; they too rarely plan for greater success than might
normally be expected. The cumulative effects of multiple sequential or simultaneous successes are also seldom
wargamed. In discussing exploitation as a potential principle of war, the authors of Military Strategy: Theory and
Application supported a wider application for the concept:
The principle of exploitation encourages momentum. It makes it possible for friendly elements to expand
and consolidate gains, keeping the enemy off balance and on the defensive. Sage strategists follow the
lines of least resistance that lead to vital objectives, pour on the pressure when opponents falter, reinforce
successes, and abandon failures. Strategic exploitation involves far more than capitalizing on military
advantage. It profits equally from political, economic, or psychological primacy and augments
technological leads.[59]
These observations apply with equal validity at the operational and tactical levels, in combat as well as noncombat
operations. Exploitation, in its broadest strategic and operational context, should be added to the list of principles of
operations.
Conclusion
The concept of adopting principles of operations as replacements for principles of war at first glance seems simple, but
there is little simple about the conduct of war or any other aspect of the profession of arms. Interventions in Haiti and
Bosnia demonstrated that the absence of armed opposition in an operational area does not lessen the rigor of activities
demanded of forces committed to such interventions. Principles of operations assist in the study of the profession;
understanding them and applying them wisely in the field is in turn possible only after repeated, careful analysis of
their purpose and meaning. Experience may partially compensate for lack of study, but application of the principles
will likely suffer from the unwilling student's inability to fully understand their value in establishing desired
operational end states and achieving national strategic objectives. So too will soldiers suffer in executing the orders of
those who have failed to educate themselves.
History reveals that the principles of war have frequently been the subject of long and often inspired debate; their
character, number, and definition have changed repeatedly. They took their present form in US Army doctrine only 49
years ago. On the one hand, this span is but a fraction of the years spent in their study. On the other, much has
transpired since 1949. One may legitimately ask whether the principles as they stand could meet the needs of US
armed forces half a century from now.
The US Army has an unusual opportunity to expand and modify its list of principles of operations. The absence of a
major threat to the United States and its allies makes such an effort both timely and feasible; it would complement
efforts to determine requirements for force structure and weapon systems for the opening decades of the 21st century.
This article restates the need for the synthesis of principles of war and of operations other than war in our operational
doctrine, and demonstrates the benefits of acknowledging that the basic tenets of doctrine transcend conflict. As
always, our doctrine must prepare us to prevail in war; the next version can and should, however, be expanded to
reflect the lessons we have learned since the end of the Cold War.
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